Professor Schattenberg, four years ago, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. What should people in Germany understand more clearly when discussing or judging this war?

At the outset, it was essential that people recognized Ukraine as a sovereign nation with its own distinct history, language, and cultural identity – not a regional variant of Russia. Ukrainian is not a dialect, but a legitimate and vital expression of national existence. This nation and its people have the same right to self-determination as Germany or France. That understanding has largely taken root.

What remains obscured is that this is not a mere conflict over shifting borders. Under Putin, Russia has become a systemic threat to Europe – not only through military aggression, but through ideology, expansionism, and imperial ambition.

Life in occupied territories cannot continue as normal. There are torture prisons, forced deportations of children, the systematic destruction and looting of cultural heritage, and state-led Russification campaigns. This is not war by proxy – it is a war of annihilation, aimed at erasing Ukrainian identity. While not comparable to the Nazi war of annihilation, it is nonetheless an assault on national sovereignty and cultural identity.

The threat to Europe’s democratic values, rule of law, and international security order remains profoundly underappreciated.

Many people now perceive the war more as background noise. Is the war being normalized? And is this a familiar historical pattern?

That’s more of a question for the fields of media theory or media history. It has a lot to do with public attention. In the early days, the war dominated headlines. Every day was counted. Then, gradually, coverage diminished. There were days with no reporting at all.

The challenge for journalism is to sustain public engagement without triggering emotional exhaustion.

Personally, in the early years, I found it nearly unbearable to engage with domestic political issues, because everything seemed trivial in light of what was happening in Ukraine. For many in my generation, this is the first war we’ve experienced so closely, though historically, that’s not entirely accurate. The Yugoslav Wars felt more distant to me.

I suspect such shifts in public attention are common. The danger lies in assuming nothing is happening anymore just because the news coverage has moved on, or in convincing oneself that the war is simply continuing as it always has. Both assumptions are deeply problematic.

Are there any historical misjudgments or narratives from the early months of the war that have proven particularly persistent?

From the beginning, many European decision-makers seemed more afraid of a Russian collapse than of a Ukrainian loss that would leave Russia on Poland’s doorstep. This mindset still lingers. There’s a persistent idea that the war can be balanced, giving Ukraine just enough to prevent collapse, but not enough to allow full liberation. This restraint is fatal. Military aid arrived too late and in insufficient quantities. The fear of being drawn into the conflict was and remains overwhelming.

As an expert on Eastern Europe, you often speak publicly about the war. What are the most frequent questions or reactions from the audience at the moment?

It’s striking that openly pro-Russian voices are hardly heard anymore. They may still exist, but they no longer speak openly. That’s reassuring. Most responses are clearly pro-Ukrainian.

There is a strong hope for a negotiated peace, successful talks between the U.S., Ukraine, and Russia. Unfortunately, I cannot share that hope. What we’re seeing now isn’t diplomacy. It’s a war of attrition. There is widespread confusion and helplessness when it becomes clear that there are no immediate prospects for a just or lasting end to the war. Economists and military analysts keep saying, if Europe and its allies were fully committed to it, the war could end. But I don’t see that willingness. And I don’t believe Russia will stop on its own, or that Trump could somehow convince Putin to do so. It is bitter.

As a historian, how do you cope when history is no longer just a subject of research, but lived reality?

It is horrific. I belong to the generation that was at university when the Berlin Wall came down. We believed in democracy, freedom, and shared values across Eastern Europe. That optimism was not unfounded.

When Putin became president in 2000 and began severely restricting press freedom, we viewed this with concern. But many assumed the authoritarian state would remain within bounds. Few foresaw that the regime would evolve from authoritarianism into open dictatorship, driven by provoked frozen conflicts into a full-scale war in Europe. It feels like a return to a moment before 1989, perhaps even to the late 1970s. It is bitter, especially, because it marks the loss of Russia as a potential partner in democratic development.

Part of our self-reflection must include asking why German historians long overlooked Ukraine and placed such central focus on Russia. Historical reasons play a role, but they are not the only factor. Today, Ukraine is at the heart of research, including in history. The era when we studied Russia first and others second is over. That is a positive development, even if I wished it had happened under different circumstances.

There are also several scholars from Ukraine working at the Research Center for Eastern European Studies. How has the war changed daily life and work at the institute?

The war has turned our world upside down, and continues to do so. Almost everyone has been affected in some way. Many scholars come from Ukraine, Russia, or Belarus. Others have close friends or family there.

We have welcomed numerous refugee researchers, as well as archivists from Memorial. Ten to twenty additional people are working at the institute, some in projects, others in newly created positions.

The atmosphere, composition, and research focus of our institute have all changed. Research on Russia is severely limited because traveling there is not possible. At the same time, new initiatives have emerged that include online interviews with people inside Russia to document public opinion on the war.

Research on Ukraine is being significantly expanded. There were already major projects on Maidan and internally displaced persons. Now, new projects are underway. Traditional archival collaborations, once focused on Russia, the Czech Republic, and Poland, are now being rebuilt with Ukraine. No area of the institute has remained untouched by this war.

Further information

On February 24, 2026, the anniversary of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Susanne Schattenberg will speak at two events about the conflict. The first event is the lecture “Der tägliche Krieg nebenan. Die Ukraine im fünften Kriegsjahr” (The Daily War Next Door: Ukraine Its Fifth Year of Conflict) and will take place at 2 p.m. at the State and University Library Bremen (SuUB). It will shed light on the background, developments, and European perspectives of the ongoing war. This will be followed at 6 p.m. by the rally “For your freedom and ours!” on Bremen’s market square, commemorating four years of war and sending a message of solidarity with Ukraine. Numerous civil society organizations are calling for visible support for the Ukrainian people.

The SuUB also invites visitors to the current exhibition “Unissued Diplomas.” This exhibition documents the stories of 40 Ukrainian students who were killed in the war, and was established by young Ukrainians as a student initiative. Founded in 2023, the project has presented this exhibition in over 30 countries on five continents. It will be on display until March 15.